This paper addresses the quality of democracy in the European Union by examining how well citizens' political views are represented in the political arena. By introducing the concept of 'voting correctly', which was developed by Redlawsk (1997, 2006), we analyze if voters select parties that most accurately represent their policy preferences. We focus on the two conflict dimensions that characterize contestation at the European level: left/right ideology and European integration. By employing data from the European Election Study 2004, we demonstrate that in terms of left right approximately six out of ten voters appear to get it right, whereas in terms of European integration about half get it right. Those not voting correctly in terms of left/right more often select parties more right-wing than themselves, but the resulting bias is limited in size. In terms of European integration these effects are more pronounced. Those not voting correctly mostly vote for parties that are less Euroskeptic than themselves. Consequently, political parties fail to accurately represent their voters on this dimension. In addition, we show that extensive variation exists across member states. This variation is largely a function of choice set (number of parties) and the electorate's level of support for European integration. These results bear important implications for our understanding of democratic representation in Europe.
Introduction
During the last two decades the process of European integration has undergone important changes. Whereas until the early 1990s, the integration process was seen -by (neo-) functionalists and (liberal) intergovernmentalists alike -as an elite-driven project in which public opinion was largely irrelevant, 1 today there is increasing evidence to suggest that issues relating to European integration are shifting from the realm of elite politics to that of mass politics. Major European initiatives, such as the creation of the common currency and with that the destruction of important political symbols such as national currencies, influence the everyday lives of citizens throughout Europe. In addition, many of the major European Treaties sparked of popular interest through contentious referendum campaigns.
To date only six out of the current 27 European Union (EU) member states have yet to hold a referendum on matters relating to the European project. 2 Consequently, it is safe to say that European issues have reached the contentious world of popular referenda and electoral politics, and that citizens are increasingly aware of the ramifications of the process (Hooghe and Marks, 2008) .
Against this backdrop, the debate regarding the lack of accountability and responsiveness in Europe intensified. Journalists and scholars alike argue that these recent events show a largely pro-European elite which is increasingly out of touch with their baseas became painfully evident through the rejections of the Constitutional Treaty in popular referendum in France and the Netherlands. While the integration process motors full speed ahead, citizens throughout Europe's capitals are increasingly weary of the project (see Eichenberg and Dalton, 2007; De Vries and Van Kersbergen, 2007) . Although recent studies demonstrate that political elites are actively monitoring their constituents (Carrubba, 2001; Steenbergen et al., 2007) , we are currently witnessing a Europe that is divided: on average 1 Such sentiments led to the notion coined by Lindberg and Scheingold (1970) that European integration was accompanied by a 'permissive consensus'. The process secured peace, welfare and stability throughout Europe and was presumed to generate a diffuse feeling of approval on the part of the European citizenry. 2 Belgium, Bulgaria, Germany, Greece, Portugal and Romania have not experienced an EU referendum.
political elites are much more in favor of European integration than their citizens (Hooghe, 2003) .
Part of the problem is that voters do not voice their opinions about European integration when they cast their votes. They base it on other considerations instead. Several scholars have emphasized that citizens fail to do so in European Parliament (EP) elections, as these constitute 'second order national elections' (Reif and Schmitt, 1980; Van der Eijk and Franklin, 1996) . However, the integration process is only partly shaped by supranational partisan conflict and salience is limited. Consequently, at least in some countries an "electoral connection" between national and European politics seems to be emerging (Carrubba, 2001 introduced by Redlawsk (1997, 2006) . The notion of a 'correct vote' refers to a vote that "is the same as the choice that would have been made under conditions of full information" (Lau and Redlawsk, 2006: 75 (Lau and Redlawsk, 2006: 16) .
The concept employed by Redlawsk (1997, 2006 ) is essentially generic, that is to say it provides a measure of the extent to which voters vote the way they would if they
were fully informed about all the issues and all candidates/parties in the election. In Lau and Redlawsk's model 'fully informed' relates to all information available in the campaign. We employ a more specific use of the term, however. We assume that 'fully informed' entails that voters have knowledge about two crucial factors, namely (a) which conflict dimensions characterize political contestation at the European level, and (b) which positions political parties take on these dimensions. In doing so, we focus on the degree to which voters vote correctly when it comes their preferences in terms of the two conflict dimensions: left/right ideology and European integration (cf. Steenbergen and Marks, 2004; Hix et al., 2006 Franklin and their colleagues concluded that European politics is in a "crisis of legitimacy" since voters are unable to express their EU preferences in either of these channels (Franklin and Van der Eijk, 1996: 3) . EP elections "are fought primarily on the basis of national political concerns, rather than on problems relevant to the European arena" (Franklin and Van der Eijk, 1996: 7) . National elections do not serve as substitutes either as they are characterized by a "lack of inter-party policy differences on European matters [which] makes it difficult for parties to fight elections on European issues" (Van der Eijk and Franklin, 1996: 369) .
Consequently, neither in their choice of national political leadership nor in their choice of members of the EP are voters able to make their preferences regarding European integration heard and democratically control the integration process. Hence, European politics lacks "an electoral connection between its citizens and its leaders" (Franklin and Van der Eijk, 1996:7) .
More than a decade later, however, much has changed. Although EP elections are still for the most part 'second-order national elections' (Schmitt, 2005) , there is increasing evidence of the impact of EU attitudes on vote choice in national elections. This phenomenon is commonly referred to as EU issue voting . Recent studies demonstrate that attitudes toward European integration are an increasingly important source in determining voters' national party choice both in absolute terms as well as relative to other typically more central concerns facing voters, such as left/right ideology (Evans, 1999; Gabel 2000 , Tillman, 2004 . 4 These findings of increased EU issue voting in the intergovernmental channel, i.e. in national elections, are not surprising. Several authors have argued that it is more rational for voters seeking a voice in the integration process to do so via national elections than via EP elections (Gabel, 2000; Mair, 2005 Mair, , 2007 . In national elections voters authorize and hold accountable national political elites, which are active in the Council of Ministers and the European Council. These institutions impose an important constraint on EU legislation in which nationally elected heads of states and government can wield power directly. In addition, nationally elected members of parliament are able to influence or at least comment on EU legislation -although their influence varies greatly among the EU member states (see Raunio, 1999) . Moreover, the Lisbon Treaty -still to be ratified by several member states -strengthens the role of national parliaments in the scrutiny of EU policies.
Hence, national elections constitute an important channel through which European citizens can exert influence on European policies.
EP elections may represent a less effective channel of influence for European citizens as the role of the EP in shaping the course and direction of European integration at the present time is more limited (Mair, 2005: 7) . In principle, EP elections should allow voters to change or endorse policies and affect the personnel of the EU's political leadership. In practice, however, the EP is constrained in fully performing these functions. First, the EP can only partially hold the Commission accountable. Second, the composition of the European 4 In keeping with Van der Eijk and Franklin (2006) Follesdal and Hix (2006: 3-4) also argue that national elections contain no "European element", as they "are fought on domestic rather than European issues, and parties collude to keep the issue of Europe off the domestic agenda" (Follesdal and Hix, 2006: 3) . Indeed, the evidence of EU issue voting so far has been conflicting. Recent research shows that EU issue voting varies across countries and times as it is conditional on the extent of partisan conflict over European integration -do voters have a range of choices with respect to party positions on Europe? -and the degree of salience of the EU issue among voters -are voters concerned about European integration? .
Council and Council of Ministers are unaffected by EP elections. Third, due to the fact that its elections are fought on national rather than European concerns, the EP lacks a clear European mandate to use its power in policy-making (see Franklin and Van der Eijk, 1996; Magnette, 2003; Mair, 2005 Mair, , 2007 . Finally, even though the influence of the EP on policy making has increased, in particular in fields where the co-decision procedure applies, in central policy domains the position of the European Parliament vis-à-vis the Council of Ministers and the European Council remains weak. So, citizens seeking voice in the European integration process should do so in national rather than EP elections.
Voting Correctly and the Quality of Democracy
The most straightforward way for voters to ensure that their opinions about European integration are heard in national elections, is by selecting representatives that have similar views on this matter. We the extent to which voters do so by employing the notion of 'voting correctly' (cf. Redlawsk, 1997, 2006) . Determining the correctness of a voter's ballot seems a daunting task which is inherently subjective. This is mainly due to the many normative lenses with which the correctness of one's vote can be evaluated. Redlawsk (1997, 2006) , however, provide a fairly straightforward way in which to determine the extent of correct voting. In their view, a correct vote indicates a voting decision that is the same as one performed under conditions of full information (Lau and Redlawsk, 2006: 75) . This definition resembles Dahl's (1989: 180-81 ) notion of a 'real' vote: "a person's interest or good is whatever a person would choose with the fullest attainable understanding of the experiences resulting from that choice and its most relevant alternatives".
The pivotal question, then, becomes: what does 'fully informed' mean? In their work Redlawsk (1997, 2006) define this in relation to the information available in a campaign. They provide two measures of voting correctly. The first is based on experimental data. In a controlled experimental setting, subjects were provided with complete information about mock candidates in a simulated election after they had voted. The vote of those participants who indicated they would not have changed their vote in light of this new information were classified as correct (Lau and Redlawsk, 1997: 588-9 ). In such an experimental setting researchers have full control over what information is available and hence are able to approach vote decision making in this way. In the real-world, however, this is virtually impossible. Redlawsk (1997, 2006 ) thus provide another measure, which builds on the presumption that voters will never be fully informed. Note that our conception of a correct vote is a narrower focus than Redlawsk's (1997, 2006) . Indeed, campaign information addresses many more issues than policy preferences of parties/candidates, such as information concerning personal characteristics of candidates. There are two reasons, however, which justify a more narrow focus. First, selecting political leadership at the EU level is, as yet, beyond the control of the European electorate(s) (see Schmitt, 2005 and Follesdal and . Second, the key functions of elections -authorization and accountability of political leadership -serve to establish responsiveness between citizens and their representatives in terms of the policies adopted (Powell, 2000) . So, a more narrow focus can also be justified on normative grounds.
Our analysis also deviates from Redlawsk's (1997, 2006) (Inglehart, 1977; Flanagan, 1987; Kitschelt, 1989; Inglehart, Rabier and Reif, 1991; Hooghe, Marks and Wilson, 2002; Kriesi, et al, 2006) . Different labels are used within the literature to capture the second dimension of political contestation. For example, Inglehart (1977) refers to it as 'materialism versus post-materialist', Kitschelt (1989) uses the terms 'libertarian versus authoritarian ' and Hooghe, Marks and Wilson (2002) label it the 'GAL (green/alternative/libertarian) versus TAN (traditional/authoritarian/ nationalist)' dimension of political conflict. But what these authors have in common is their contention that a second cultural dimension exists next to the economic left/right dimension. This second dimension of political contestation involves the divide between values, such as public order, national security and traditional life styles, and values, such as individual choice, political participation and environmental protection (Dalton, 1996: 81-2) .
In this paper we focus on left/right ideology in conjecture with the European integration dimension as the EES 2004 does not include indicators of party or voter positioning on a cultural dimension of political competition. Although unfortunate, this may be less problematic as research shows that left/right ideology in Western Europe is still by far the most dominant dimension in party competition and elections (see Pierce, 1999) .
This brings us to a first expectation for the analysis. As noted above, one problem regarding representation on EU matters is that voters choices at the polls are not strongly shaped by their opinions about European integration. Because the ideological division between left and right is widely conceived as the dominant dimension of conflict in national politics (Pierce, 1999) , we expect that voting correctly in terms of left/right occurs more frequently than on European integration (hypothesis H1).
H1. The levels of voting correctly will be higher in terms of left/right than in terms of European integration.
When assessing the quality of European democracy, it is important to bear in mind The second hypothesis (H2) relates to the size of the choice set, i.e. the number of parties/candidates in the respective election. We expect higher levels of correct voting when there are fewer alternatives in the choice set rather than when there are more parties to choose from. One reason is voters' cognitive constraints: it is easier to have knowledge about few parties than about many parties. The second reason is methodological. If voters would cast their vote at random, the chances that they would have voted for the party closest to them on a particular issue is simply higher if with a lower number of parties: it amounts to 50 percent when two parties compete, but is only 20 percent in the case of five parties.
H2. The greater the choice set of political parties, the higher the extent of correct voting in terms of European integration.
The third hypothesis (H3) relates to the distinctiveness of issue positions of political parties. The intuition is that the easier it is for voters to distinguish between issue positions of political parties, the higher the likelihood of correct voting. In our case this means that the higher the distinctness of party positions on European integration, the more accurate voters' decisions will be in terms of their EU preferences.
H3. The more distinct the positions of political parties on European integration, the higher the likelihood of correct voting in terms of European integration.
Thirdly, it may prove useful when addressing European integration to also focus on the aggregate level of support for European integration in a country. From the extensive literature on support for European integration, we know that since the mid 1990s political elites on average are much more supportive of the European project than the mass public (see Hooghe, 2003) . As a result, it should be quite difficult for harsh critics of European integration to vote correctly in terms of this preference, unless such voters would ignore all other considerations they consider important. On the other hand, it should be easier for avid supporters to vote in line with their preferences regarding European integration. Hypothesis H4 below formalizes this expectation.
H4. The more extensive the support for European integration, the higher the likelihood of correct voting in terms of European integration.
Self-evidently, this last factor is not included in the model by Lau and Redlawsk (2006) as they do not focus on representation in terms of European integration. Instead they (2006: 84) instead they introduce a different macro-level factor: the balance of an electoral campaign. The idea here is that voters are better able to make correct decisions when the campaign is balanced, i.e. giving all sides equal opportunity to get their message out. Coming from the US context, the researchers focus on the (material) resources available to each candidate. This is less useful in Western Europe, as material resources appear to play a less crucial role and thus are not suitable as a proxy for campaign attention. In the European context the degree of partisan bias in media reporting on particular issues has to be assessed differently. Unfortunately, we lack encompassing empirical data on media reporting regarding European integration in national electoral campaigns to include this factor into our analysis.
Measuring Correct Voting in Terms of Left/Right and European Integration
To measure the extent of correct voting, we rely on the European Election Study (EES) data from 2004. Albeit that the EES focuses on EP elections, it also contains a measure of vote choice in national elections. The survey asks respondents for which party they voted in the latest national elections. The EES has the advantage that it allows for an comparison of correct voting in terms of left/right as well as European integration -and with that the quality of democratic representation -in the same way for a large number of countries simultaneously. Because the twelve member states that fairly recently joined the EU have such a different position compared to the fifteen older members, we only focus on the latter. Also, we have to limit our analysis to thirteen member states as the surveys of Belgium and Sweden did not entail all relevant information concerning party and voter placements on European integration. Consequently, we excluded these two countries from our analysis. between five (Austria) and fourteen (Italy); in most countries respondents are asked to rate six to eight parties. In the same vein, respondents are asked to place their own views as well as those of the same set of parties on a ten-point scale concerning European integration. In this case the end-points are that European unification has already gone too far (1) and that it should be pushed further (10). By answering these questions voters indicate, albeit indirectly, how similar they perceive their own political views to be compared to the positions of the various political parties. We employ a simple measure as indicator of perceived agreement in terms of either dimension, namely the distance between a voter's position and the perceived position of a party. Voting correctly in terms of left/right is thus defined as voting for the party (or one of the parties) that is perceived closest on this scale. Note that this matches the 'shortest distance hypothesis' in Downs' (1957) conception of rational voting (see also Enelow and Hinich, 1984) . Voting correctly in terms of European integration implies casting a vote for the party that is perceived closest on this scale. In the case of ties -two or more parties equally close -a vote for any of them is considered a correct vote. 7 One might argue that these measures employed fail to take into account the bias resulting from inaccurate perceptions of parties' positions on both scales and that the respondents' scores should be replaced by externally validated party positions, e.g the mean score awarded by all voters. This would only make sense, however, if voters would use the scale in an identical manner to indicate their own view. Whether they in fact do, is questionable. In particular with respect to left/right, respondents may interpret these labels in different ways. For example, whereas some may define left/right in terms of economic issues, others may define it in terms on cultural issues. For that reason, we use respondents' own perception of party positions. To the extent that this affects our results, it will imply that we are most likely to overestimate the degree of correct voting.
Note also that if one conceives of both dimensions as making up one 'political space' (cf. Downs, 1957) , voting correctly may also be analyzed by creating measures that indicate distances in this two-dimensional space. In our analyses we have not included such measures, but focus solely on the quality of representation in terms of each dimension individually. As will become clear, we observe stark differences between both dimensions; such differences would have been masked if both dimensions were combined (see also hypothesis H1 above).
7 Votes for partisan alliances are considered correct if this alliance included the party that best represents a voter's views; for the German alliance of CDU/CSU perceived issue positions of the CDU have been used.
The Degree of and Variation in Correct Voting in Terms European Integration
Before we turn to the examination of the extent of correct voting in terms of both the left/right and European integration dimension of political conflict, let us first provide an overview of voters' and parties' positions on left/right and European integration. These pieces of information are the key components in determining the extent of correct voting. Figure 1 provides an overview of voters' left/right positions across the thirteen EU member states. To enhance clarity of presentation, we rescaled the left/right continuum to three categories: left-wing (1-4), centre (5-6), and right-wing (7-10).
8 Figure 2 shows voters' stances towards European integration. We rescaled this scale similarly to the following three categories: 'should be pushed further' (7-10), 'has gone too far' (1-4), and 'neither' (5-6).
- Erikson, et al. 2002; Surowiecki, 2004) . So, the electorate as a whole holds a fairly accurate image of where parties stand. In order to ensure the validity of these measurements, we cross-validated them with the positions identified using the Chapel Hill Expert Survey (CHES) from 2006 (Bakker et al., 2008) . European project is strongest among smaller parties, especially those on the extremes of the left/right dimension (see also Hooghe et al., 2002) . Hence, these findings underline previous research demonstrating that we are witnessing a divided Europe in which voters on average are more skeptical about European integration than political parties in the same country (Hooghe, 2003) .
Keeping these things in mind, let us turn to the levels of correct voting in terms of In other words, do voters vote for parties that are more, equally, or less right-wing or Euroskeptic than themselves? Table 1 voters who voted correctly, about two out of three votes for a party that they perceived to take an identical position in terms of left/right. The others sometimes opted for a party they perceived as more left-wing, whereas similar numbers opted for a party perceived as more right wing. Consequently, at the aggregate level in terms of left/right voters who voted correctly were represented quite accurately by their parties. When voters did not get it right, they tended more strongly to parties that they perceive to be more right-wing than themselves. Whereas 36 per cent voted for a more left-wing party, 64 per cent voted for a more right-wing party. Bearing in mind that about 40 per cent voted incorrectly, these figures imply that at aggregate roughly one in ten voters cast their vote for a party that is perceived somewhat more right-wing than voters themselves. Table 2 presents a similar analysis for the European integration dimension. These results show that those who voted correctly mostly did so for a party that took an identical position. The others, again, split more or less evenly between parties that held more or less favorable opinions about further integration. Furthermore, the findings clearly indicate that those voters that did not get it right mostly voted for parties -on the basis of other apparently more important considerations -that were less Euroskeptic. Those voting for parties with more favorable stands towards integration outnumbered those voting for parties less supportive of moving ahead with integration by three to one. As a result, at the aggregate level about one out of every four voters cast their vote for a party that favored integration more strongly. Hence, whereas in terms of left/right the bias in representation is modest, regarding European integration the bias is rather severe.
--- Table 1 and 2 about here ---
The results also indicate that extensive variation exists across countries in the ability to which voters get it right when it comes to their left/right and EU preferences. Since the bias is strongest with respect to European integration, we now solely focus on this dimension. The size of this bias on this dimension is the lowest in Spain and the highest in 
Figures and Tables
Notes: The ten-point scale of left/right has been recoded into three categories: left-wing (1-4), centre (5-6), and right-wing (7-10). In Sweden only the value '5' is labeled 'centre', because here an eleven-point scale (0-10) was used instead. 
